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Impacts on NAFTA Members of Multilateral and Regional Trading Arrangements 
and Initiatives and Harmonization of NAFTA’s External Tariffs 
 
Drusilla K. Brown, Tufts University 
Alan V. Deardorff, University of Michigan 




We have used the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade to simulate the economic effects on 
the NAFTA member countries and other major trading countries/regions of a prospective new round of 
WTO multilateral trade negotiations, the variety of free trade agreements (FTAs) that the NAFTA 
members have negotiated or are considering, and the adoption of a system of common external tariffs by 
the NAFTA members. 
 
We estimate that an assumed reduction of post-Uruguay Round tariffs on agricultural and industrial 
products and services barriers by 33 percent in a new WTO trade round would increase world welfare by 
$613.0 billion, with gains of $177.3 billion for the United States, $13.5 billion for Canada, $6.5 billion for 
Mexico, and significant gains for all other industrialized and developing countries.  If there were global 
free trade, world welfare would increase three-fold to $1.9 trillion and the country/region gains would be 
similarly larger. 
 
Regional FTAs such as an expansion of NAFTA to include Chile and a Western Hemisphere FTA would 
increase global and member-country welfare but much less than a new WTO multilateral trade round 
would.  Separate bilateral FTAs negotiated or being considered by Canada, Mexico, and the United States 
would have positive, though generally small, welfare effects on the partner countries, but potentially 
disruptive sectoral employment shifts in some countries.  There would be trade diversion and detrimental 
welfare effects on some nonmember countries for both the regional and bilateral FTAs analyzed. 
 
If the NAFTA members were to adopt a system of common external tariffs to replace their existing 
differentiated external tariffs, a system based on trade weights would have less distortive effects on trade 
and welfare than a system based on simple averages or production-weighted tariffs. 
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I.  Introduction 
The purpose of our paper is to assess how the members of the North American Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA) – Canada, Mexico, and the United States – may be impacted by: (1) a new round of multilateral 
trade negotiations to be carried out under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO); (2) the 
variety of free trade agreements (FTAs) that the NAFTA countries have actually negotiated and some 
others currently being considered; and (3) the adoption of a common external tariff that would replace 
each country’s national tariffs and do away with rules of origin.  In the foregoing assessments, we rely on 
the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade.  The Michigan Model is a multi-country, multi-
sector computational general equilibrium (CGE) model that we have used now for more than 25 years to 
analyze changes in trade policies. 
In Section II, we first analyze the potential economic effects of the liberalization of trade in 
agricultural products and services, which are currently in the early negotiation stages of a new WTO trade 
round as part of the built-in agenda mandated in the Uruguay Round.  We also consider the liberalization 
of trade in industrial products, which is yet to be decided pending agreement among the WTO members 
on the agenda for a new trade round.  In Section III, we analyze regional negotiating options of interest to 
the present NAFTA member countries.  These options include the expansion of NAFTA to include Chile 
and what we refer to as a Western Hemisphere FTA (WHFTA), which is an approximation of the Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).  In Section IV, we analyze several bilateral FTAs that each of the 
NAFTA members has already carried out or is currently considering.  Section V contains an analysis of   2
the economic effects of the harmonization of NAFTA’s external tariffs.  Conclusions and implications for 
policy are discussed in Section VI. 
II. Computational Analysis of the Prospective WTO Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
  In this section we analyze the economic effects of the trade liberalization that may occur in a new 
negotiating round. As mentioned, we will use CGE model-based simulation analysis to assess these 
effects. We begin by providing a brief overview of the Michigan Model. 
Overview of the Michigan CGE Model 
The distinguishing feature of the Michigan Model is that it incorporates some aspects of the New 
Trade Theory, including increasing returns to scale, monopolistic competition, and product heterogeneity.  
Some details follow.
1  A more complete description of the formal structure and equations of the model can 
be found on line at www.Fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/model/. 
Sectors and Market Structure 
  The version of the model to be used here consists of 20 countries/regions (plus rest-of-world) and 
18 production sectors.  The country/region and sectoral coverage are indicated in the tables below.
2  
Agriculture is modeled as perfectly competitive with product differentiation by country of origin, and all 
other sectors as monopolistically competitive with free entry and exit of differentiated-product firms. 
Expenditure 
  Consumers and producers are assumed to use a two-stage procedure to allocate expenditure across 
differentiated products. In the first stage, expenditure is allocated across goods without regard to the country 
of origin or producing firm. At this stage, the utility function is Cobb-Douglas, and the production function 
                                                 
1 Readers not interested in the model details may proceed directly to the computational results. 
2 The individual countries listed in table 1 below, and the industries in table 2, are self-explanatory, as is the 
European Union (EU).  EFTA is the European Free Trade Association and here includes Iceland, Norway, and 
Switzerland.  Rest of Asia is India, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam.  CCS is Caribbean, Central and South America, 
consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay, Venezuela, and the Rest of the Andean Pact.  The Middle East 
and North Africa consists of Morocco, Turkey, and the Rest of North Africa.   3
requires intermediate inputs in fixed proportions. In the second stage, expenditure on monopolistically 
competitive goods is allocated across the competing varieties supplied by each firm from all countries. In 
the case of sectors that are perfectly competitive, since individual firm supply is indeterminate, expenditure 
is allocated over each country’s industry as a whole, with imperfect substitution between products of 
different countries. The aggregation function in the second stage is a Constant Elasticity of Substitution 
(CES) function. 
Production 
  The production function is separated into two stages. In the first stage, intermediate inputs and a 
primary composite of capital and labor are used in fixed proportion to output.
3  In the second stage, capital 
and labor are combined through a CES function to form the primary composite. In the monopolistically 
competitive sectors, additional fixed inputs of capital and labor are required. It is assumed that fixed capital 
and fixed labor are used in the same proportion as variable capital and variable labor so that production 
functions are homothetic. 
Supply Prices  
  To determine equilibrium prices, perfectly competitive firms operate such that price is equal to 
marginal cost, while monopolistically competitive firms maximize profits by setting price as an optimal 
mark-up over marginal cost. The numbers of firms in sectors under monopolistic competition are 
determined by the condition that there are zero profits. 
Capital and Labor Markets 
  Capital and labor are assumed to be perfectly mobile across sectors within each country. Returns to 
capital and labor are determined so as to equate factor demand to an exogenous supply of each factor. The 
aggregate supplies of capital and labor in each country are assumed to remain fixed so as to abstract from 
                                                 
3 Intermediate inputs include both domestic and imported varieties.   4
macroeconomic considerations (e.g., the determination of investment), since our microeconomic focus is on 
the intersectoral allocation of resources. 
World Market and Trade Balance 
  The world market determines equilibrium prices such that all markets clear.  Total demand for each 
firm or sector’s product must equal total supply of that product. It is also assumed that trade remains 
balanced for each country/region, that is, any initial trade imbalance remains constant as trade barriers are 
changed. This assumption reflects the reality of mostly flexible exchange rates among the countries 
involved. Moreover, this is a way of abstracting from the macroeconomic forces and policies that are the 
main determinants of trade imbalances. 
Trade Policies and Rent/Revenues 
  We have incorporated into the model the import tariff rates and export taxes/subsidies as policy 
inputs that are applicable to the bilateral trade of the various countries/regions with respect to one another.  
These have been computed using the “GTAP–4 Database” provided in McDougall et al. (1998). The 
export barriers have been estimated as export-tax equivalents.  We assume that revenues from both import 
tariffs and export taxes, as well as rents from NTBs on exports, are redistributed to consumers in the 
tariff- or tax-levying country and are spent like any other income. When tariffs are reduced, this means 
that income available to purchase imports falls along with their prices, and there is no bias towards 
expanding or contracting overall demand.   
Model Closure and Implementation 
  We assume in the model that aggregate expenditure varies endogenously to hold aggregate 
employment constant.  This closure is analogous to the Johansen closure rule (Deardorff and Stern, 1990). 
The Johansen closure rule consists of keeping the requirement of full employment while dropping the 
consumption function. This means that consumption can be thought of as adjusting endogenously to ensure   5
full employment. However, in the present model, we do not distinguish consumption from other sources of 
final demand. That is, we assume instead that total expenditure adjusts to maintain full employment. 
  The model is solved using GEMPACK (Harrison and Pearson, 1996). When policy changes are 
introduced into the model, the method of solution yields percentage changes in sectoral employment and 
certain other variables of interest. Multiplying the percentage changes by the levels projected for the year 
2005, which is when the Uruguay Round provisions will have been fully implemented, yields the absolute 
changes, positive or negative, which might result from the various liberalization scenarios. 
The Data 
Needless to say, the data needs of this model are immense.  Apart from numerous share 
parameters, the model requires various types of elasticity measures.  Like other CGE models, most of our 
data come from published sources.   
  As mentioned above, the main data source is “The GTAP-4 Database” of the Purdue University 
Center for Global Trade Analysis Project (McDougall et al., 1998).   The reference year for this database is 
1995.  From this source, we have extracted the following data, aggregated to our sectors and regions: 
1.  Bilateral trade flows among 20 countries/regions, decomposed into 18 sectors.  Trade with the 
rest-of-world (ROW) is included to close the model. 
2.  Input-output tables for the 20 countries/regions, excluding ROW 
3.  Components of final demand along with sectoral contributions for the 20 countries/regions, 
excluding ROW  
4.  Gross value of output and value added at the sectoral level for the 20 countries/regions, 
excluding ROW 
5.  Bilateral import tariffs by sector among the 20 countries/regions 
6.  Elasticity of substitution between capital and labor by sector 
7.  Bilateral export-tax equivalents among the 20 countries/regions, decomposed into 18 sectors   6
  The monopolistically competitive market structure in the non-agricultural sectors of the model 
imposes an additional data requirement of the number of firms at the sectoral level. These data have been 
drawn from the United Nations, International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, 1998.
4  
  We also need estimates of sectoral employment for the countries/regions of the model.  These 
data have been drawn from:  UNIDO, 1995, International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, and the 
World Bank, 1997, World Development Report. The employment data have been aggregated according to 
our sectoral/regional aggregation to obtain sectoral estimates of workers employed in manufactures.  The 
World Development Report was used to obtain data for the other sectors.
5 
  We have projected the GTAP-4 1995 database to the year 2005 by extrapolating the labor 
availability in different countries/regions using an average weighted population growth rate of 1.2 per 
cent per annum.  This figure was computed from the growth-rate forecasts for the period 1997-2010 
provided for various countries in table 2.3 of the World Bank’s 1999 World Development Indicators.  All 
other major variables have also been projected, using an average weighted growth rate of GDP of 2.5 per 
cent per annum, for all of the countries/regions of our model during the period 1990-1997, as per table 11 
of the 1989/99 World Development Report.
6 
  The projected database provides us with an approximate picture of what the world could be 
expected to look like in 2005 if the Uruguay Round (UR) negotiations had not occurred.  The UR 
reductions in trade barriers were implemented beginning in 1995 and will be completed by 2005.  In 
Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (2001), we have analyzed the impact of the UR-induced changes that are 
expected to occur over the course of the 10-year implementation period as a consequence of the 
negotiated reductions in tariffs and non-tariff barriers.  We then readjusted the scaled-up database for 
2005 to mimic the world as it might look in the post-UR implementation.  In what follows, we use these 
re-adjusted data as the starting point to carry out the liberalization scenarios for a forthcoming WTO 
                                                 
4 This source does not provide number-of-firms data for all countries. We have used the number-of-firms data for 
similar countries in these cases.  
5 We also need data on supply elasticities from ROW, which have been taken from the Michigan Model database. 
6 See Hertel and Martin (1999) and Hertel (2000) for a more elaborate and detailed procedure for calculating year 
2005 projections.   7
negotiating round, involving possible reductions in tariffs on agricultural products and manufactures and 
reductions of barriers to trade in services. 
Computational Scenarios 
  As already mentioned, the built-in agenda of the Uruguay Round mandated that multilateral 
negotiations under WTO auspices would commence for agriculture and services in 2000.  It had been 
expected that the agenda for a broader WTO negotiating round would be approved at the WTO 
Ministerial Meeting held in Seattle in December 1999.  However, because of the lack of consensus in 
Seattle among the WTO members,
7 decisions on the details of the negotiating agenda for a new round 
were put off until some future date.  Although at the time of writing (June 2001) nothing definite yet has 
been decided, it may nonetheless be instructive to use the Michigan Model to assess the magnitudes of the 
economic effects that may result from a new round.  Accordingly, we have run what we refer to as the 
Millennium Round liberalization scenarios.  These scenarios assume 33 percent reductions in post-
Uruguay Round tariffs and services barriers, as follows: 




MR-2   Liberalization of industrial products is modeled as a 33 percent reduction in post-Uruguay 
Round tariffs on mining and manufactured products. 
 
MR-3   Services liberalization is modeled as a 33 percent reduction in estimated post-Uruguay Round 
services barriers. 
 
MR-4   This combines MR-1, MR-2, and MR-3. 
 
  In addition to the foregoing scenarios, we thought it would be of interest to run a scenario of 
global free trade, as follows: 
MR-5   Global free trade is modeled as complete removal of all post-Uruguay Round tariffs on 
agricultural products and industrial products as well as services barriers. 
                                                 
7 See Deardorff and Stern (2001) for discussion of the differences that prevented consensus in Seattle. 
8 Reductions in post-Uruguay Round agricultural export subsidies will presumably also be negotiated in a new trade 
round, but they are not included in this scenario.   8
  With regard to MR-3, services liberalization, we may note that, while services issues were 
addressed in the Uruguay Round, the main accomplishment was the creation of the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS).  The GATS is an umbrella agreement setting out the rules governing the four 
modes of providing services transactions internationally.  These modes are:  (1) cross-border services 
(e.g., telecommunications); (2) services provided in the country of consumption (e.g., tourism); (3) 
services requiring a domestic presence in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI); and (4) movement 
of natural persons. In an earlier study, Brown and Stern (2001) developed a new version of the Michigan 
Model for the purpose of analyzing the behavior of multinational firms, which are major providers of 
services, both intra-firm as well as in the production and sales of foreign affiliates located in host 
countries.
9 To approximate existing services barriers, Brown and Stern used estimates of barriers to FDI 
provided by Hoekman (2000), based on the gross operating margins of services firms listed on national 
stock exchanges for the period, 1994-96.  These gross operating margins, which were calculated as the 
differences between total revenues and total operating costs, are indicated in percentage form in table 1 
for construction, trade & transportation, other private services, and government services.   
Some of the differences between total revenues and costs are presumably attributable to fixed 
cost.  Given that the gross operating margins vary across countries, a portion of the margins can also be 
attributed to barriers to FDI.  For this purpose, we have selected as a benchmark for each sector the 
country with the smallest gross operating margin, on the assumption that operations in that country can be 
considered to be freely open to foreign firms.  The excess in any other country above this lowest 
benchmark is then taken to be due to barriers to establishment by foreign firms.  That is, the barrier is 
modeled as the cost increase attributable to an increase in fixed cost borne by multinational corporations 
attempting to establish an enterprise locally in a host country.  In this paper, we further assume for 
purposes of analysis that we can interpret this cost increase as an ad valorem equivalent tariff on 
                                                 
9 Because of computer-capacity constraints, Brown and Stern use a 3-sector aggregation consisting of agriculture, 
manufactures, and services and the same 20-country/region breakdown as is being used here.  They also differ from 
the present analysis by making allowance for international flows of FDI and increases in capital stocks in response 
to the multilateral trade liberalization that they analyze.   9
international services transactions generally.  Our simulation MR-3 assumes then that these services 
barriers are to be reduced by 33 percent in a new trade round. 
Computational Results 
  To help the reader interpret the results, it is useful first to review the features of the model that 
serve to identify the various economic effects that are being captured in the different scenarios.  Although 
the model includes the aforementioned features of the New Trade Theory, it remains the case that markets 
respond to trade liberalization in much the same way that they would with perfect competition.  That is, 
when tariffs or other trade barriers are reduced in a sector, domestic buyers (both final and intermediate) 
substitute toward imports, and the domestic competing industry contracts production while foreign 
exporters expand.  With multilateral liberalization reducing tariffs and other trade barriers simultaneously 
in most sectors and countries, each country’s industries share in both of these effects, expanding or 
contracting depending primarily on whether their protection is reduced more or less than in other sectors 
and countries.  At the same time, countries with larger average tariff reductions than their trading partners 
tend to experience a real depreciation of their currencies in order to maintain a constant trade balance, so 
that all countries therefore experience mixtures of both expanding and contracting sectors. 
  Worldwide, these changes cause increased international demand for all sectors, with world prices 
rising most for those sectors where trade barriers fall the most.  This in turn causes changes in countries’ 
terms of trade that can be positive or negative.  Those countries that are net exporters of goods with the 
greatest degree of liberalization will experience increases in their terms of trade, as the world prices of 
their exports rise relative to their imports.  The reverse occurs for net exporters in industries where 
liberalization is slight  -- perhaps because it already happened in previous trade rounds. 
  The effects on the welfare of countries arise from a mixture of these terms-of-trade effects, 
together with the standard efficiency gains from trade and also from additional benefits due to elements of 
the New Trade Theory.  Thus, we expect on average that the world will gain from multilateral 
liberalization, as resources are reallocated to those sectors in each country where there is a comparative   10
advantage. In the absence of terms-of-trade effects, these efficiency gains should raise national welfare 
measured by the equivalent variation for every country, although some factor owners within a country 
may lose, as will be noted below.  However, it is possible for a particular country whose net imports are 
concentrated in sectors with the greatest liberalization to lose overall, if the worsening of its terms of trade 
swamps these efficiency gains. 
On the other hand, although the New Trade Theory is perhaps best known for introducing new 
reasons why countries may lose from trade, in fact its greatest contribution is to expand the list of reasons 
for gains from trade.  It is these that are the dominant contribution of the New Trade Theory in our model.  
That is, trade liberalization permits all countries to expand their export sectors at the same time that all 
sectors compete more closely with a larger number of competing varieties from abroad.  As a result, 
countries as a whole gain from lower costs due to increasing returns to scale, lower monopoly distortions 
due to greater competition, and reduced costs and/or increased utility due to greater product variety.  All 
of these effects make it more likely that countries will gain from liberalization in ways that are shared 
across the entire population. 
  In perfectly competitive trade models such as the Heckscher-Ohlin Model, one expects countries 
as a whole to gain from trade, but the owners of one factor – the “scarce factor” – to lose through the 
mechanism first explored by Stolper and Samuelson (1941).  The additional sources of gain from trade 
due to increasing returns to scale, competition, and product variety, however, are shared across factors, 
and we routinely find in our CGE modeling that both labor and capital gain from liberalization.  That is 
often the case here. 
  In the real world, all of the foregoing effects occur over time, some of them more quickly than 
others.  Our model is however static, based upon a single set of equilibrium conditions rather than 
relationships that vary over time.  Our results therefore refer to a time horizon that is somewhat uncertain, 
depending on the assumptions that have been made about which variables do and do not adjust to 
changing market conditions, and on the short- or long-run nature of these adjustments.  Because our 
elasticities of supply and demand reflect relatively long-run adjustments and because we assume that   11
markets for both labor and capital clear within countries, our results are appropriate for a relatively long 
time horizon of several years – perhaps two or three at a minimum. 
On the other hand, our model does not allow for the very long-run adjustments that could occur 
through capital accumulation, population growth, and technological change.  Our results should therefore 
be thought of as being superimposed upon longer-run growth paths of the economies involved.  To the 
extent that these growth paths themselves may be influenced by trade liberalization, therefore, our model 
does not capture that.  
Aggregate Results
10 
The aggregate effects on economic welfare of the individual Millennium Round scenarios (MR-1-
MR-4) and global free trade (MR-5) are presented in table 2,
11 and the sectoral employment results of 
scenario MR-4 for Canada, Mexico, and the United States are presented in table 3. 
  MR-1:  Agricultural Liberalization  – The assumed 33 percent reduction in post-Uruguay 
Round agricultural-import tariffs is shown in table 2 to increase global welfare by $10.8 billion.  The 
welfare increases for Canada ($67 million) and Mexico ($111 million) are relatively small, whereas the 
United States records a welfare decline of $4.1 billion.  The expansion of U.S. agriculture apparently has 
the effect of drawing resources away from the monopolistically competitive, non-agricultural sectors, 
thereby producing negative scale effects in these sectors.  Similar negative welfare effects are also noted 
for Australia and New Zealand, both of which are net exporters of agricultural products. 
  MR-2:  Liberalization of Industrial Products –The assumed 33 percent reduction of post-
Uruguay Round manufacturing tariffs results in an increase in global welfare of $210.7 billion, which is 
considerably greater than the $90.3 billion welfare gain from the Uruguay Round liberalization of 
manufacturing tariffs noted in Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (2001).  Liberalization of manufactures in a 
                                                 
10 The potential gains from a new WTO trade round are also analyzed in Hertel (2000), based on the GTAP CGE 
model, which is a widely used modeling structure.  The version used by Hertel assumes perfect competition in all 
sectors.  It also assumes national product differentiation (i.e., the Armington assumption), which may tend to 
exaggerate terms-of-trade effects. 
11 The aggregate results for the effects on exports, imports, and the returns to capital and labor, are available in 
Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (2001).   12
new trade round is seen to increase welfare in all of the countries/regions listed.  While not noted in the 
table, there are positive effects as well on real wages and the return to capital.  There are welfare gains of 
$63.3 billion for EU/EFTA, $57.8 billion for Japan, $31.3 billion for the United States, $2.8 billion for 
Canada, and $1.1 billion for Mexico.  While the welfare gains for the developing countries/regions are 
much smaller in absolute terms, the percentage gains tend to be larger, ranging from 0.5 percent for China 
to 3.5 percent for the Philippines.   
  MR-3:  Services Liberalization – As noted above, the Uruguay Round negotiations on services 
resulted in creation of the GATS, but no significant liberalization of services barriers occurred.   
Following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, there have been successful multilateral negotiations to 
liberalize telecommunications and financial services.  While it would be desirable to assess the economic 
effects of these sectoral agreements, we cannot do so here because of lack of data.  What we have done 
then is to use the estimates of services barriers based on the calculations of gross operating margins for 
services firms in the countries/regions in our model, as already described above and as shown in table 1.  
These estimates of services barriers are intended to be indirect approximations of what the actual barriers 
may be and thus should not be taken literally.  Assuming that the ad valorem equivalents of these barriers 
are reduced by 33 percent, it can be seen in table 2 that global economic welfare rises by $389.6 billion, 
which exceeds the $210.7 billion welfare increase for manufactures liberalization.  All of the 
countries/regions listed experience positive welfare gains as well as increases in real wages and returns to 
capital.  The United States has the largest welfare gain of $150.0 billion, compared to $103.4 billion for 
EU/EFTA and $61.6 billion for Japan.  Canada’s welfare gain is $10.6 billion and Mexico’s gain is $5.2 
billion.  For several of the smaller industrialized and developing countries, the percentage increases in 
welfare are noteworthy. 
  MR-4:  Combined Liberalization Effects (MR-1 + MR-2 + MR-3) – The results for MR-4 are 
the sum of the other three scenarios.  Overall, in table 2, global welfare rises by $613.0 billion.  Canada’s 
welfare gain is $13.5 and Mexico’s gain is $6.5 billion.  The United States has a welfare gain of $177.3   13
billion, EU/EFTA a gain of $168.9 billion, and Japan a gain of $123.7 billion.  The percentage welfare 
gains are sizable in most of the smaller industrialized countries and in the developing countries. 
  MR-5:  Global Free Trade – Since our model is linear, the effects of removal of all tariffs and 
services barriers would then be some three times the results of MR-4.  Thus, in table 2, global free trade 
would increase global welfare by $1.9 trillion.  The welfare gains for the United States are $537.2 billion 
(5.9 percent of GNP), EU/EFTA, $511.9 billion (4.7 percent of GNP), Japan, $374.8 billion (5.8 percent 
of GNP), Canada, $40.9 billion (5.6 percent of GNP), and Mexico, $19.6 billion (5.6 percent of GNP).  
The gains as a percentage of GNP for the other industrialized countries and the developing countries are 
also sizable, ranging from 3.5 percent  for Australia to 17.0 percent for Singapore. 
Sectoral Results  
The sectoral employment results for MR-4 for Canada, Mexico, and the United States are 
presented in table 3.
12  For all three NAFTA countries, there are notable employment declines in textiles, 
wearing apparel, leather products and footwear, and in some service sectors, while employment increases 
especially in agriculture and most of the remaining manufactures sectors.  The sectoral employment 
results for global free trade in Scenario MR-5, which are not shown here, are some three times the 
amounts shown in table 3.   
Conclusion 
  The foregoing computational results suggest that there are substantial welfare gains for the 
NAFTA countries and the other industrialized and developing countries to be realized from a new WTO 
multilateral negotiating round.  The sectoral employment increases for the NAFTA countries are 
concentrated in agriculture and the relatively more capital-intensive industries, and there are sectoral 
employment decreases in the relatively labor-intensive industries.  This is the case for the assumed 33 
percent reductions in the post-Uruguay Round tariffs and barriers to services, and even more so if there 
were global free trade.   
                                                 
12 Sectoral results for percentage changes in exports, imports, output, and scale economies are given in Brown, 
Deardorff, and Stern (2001).   14
We should note, as discussed above, that our computational model is based on a comparative 
static approach, meaning that we move from an initial position to a new equilibrium in which all of the 
liberalization and adjustment to it is complete.  That is, we abstract from a variety of dynamic and related 
effects that may occur through time, especially with the international mobility of real capital, increases in 
capital accumulation via real investment, and technological improvements.  Our results should thus be 
interpreted as a lower limit to the economic benefits that may ultimately be realized from a new WTO 
multilateral negotiating round and, if it were possible, from a movement to global free trade.
13 
III. Analysis of Regional Negotiating Options 
  In this section, we consider two regional negotiating options that are actively being pursued by 
the NAFTA member countries.  These include an expansion of NAFTA to include Chile, and an 
approximation to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) that we refer to as a Western Hemisphere 
FTA (WHFTA) that involves the NAFTA countries.  These scenarios are: 
 
RA-1:  NAFTA-Chile FTA – elimination of all bilateral post-Uruguay Round agricultural and 
manufactures tariffs and services barriers between the NAFTA members and Chile. 
 
RA-2:  Western Hemisphere FTA (WHFTA) – elimination of all bilateral post-Uruguay Round 
agricultural and manufactures tariffs and services barriers among the NAFTA members and 




                                                 
13 Brown and Stern (2001) have used their 3-sector, 20-country CGE model that incorporates the behavior of 
multinational corporations (MNCs) and their foreign affiliates and international mobility of FDI-related capital to 
assess  the effects of 33 percent reductions in post-Uruguay Round tariffs and services barriers.  Making allowance 
for imperfect mobility of real international capital and fixed world capital stocks, they estimate that the combined 
reductions in tariffs and services barriers would increase global welfare by $193.2 billion.  The welfare increase for 
Japan is $3.1 billion and for the United States, $45.8 billion.  When allowance is made for increases in the world 
capital stock of 2 percent in response to the assumed liberalization, the increase in world economic welfare rises to 
$612.4 billion, with an increase for Japan of $80.2 billion and for the United States, $178.4 billion.  International 
capital mobility combined with an increase in capital accumulation may therefore generate welfare changes that are 
different in size and geographical distribution as compared to the results generated in the more disaggregated, 
sectoral version of the Michigan Model used here, which abstracts from the behavior of MNCs in response to trade 
liberalization.  Time and resource constraints have thus far prevented Brown and Stern from expanding the sectoral 
coverage of their FDI model to analyze the more detailed responses to trade liberalization for the world’s major 
trading countries and regions. 
14 The CCS aggregate comprises:  Central America and Caribbean; Venezuela; Colombia; Rest of Andean Pact; 
Argentina; Brazil; Uruguay; and Rest of South America.   15
In each of these cases, our reference point is the post-Uruguay Round, 2005 database described 
above together with the post-Uruguay Round tariff rates on agricultural products and manufactures and 
the specially constructed measures of services barriers used in the Millennium Round scenarios in Section 
II preceding.  Four scenarios have been carried out for each of the two arrangements noted: (A) removal 
of agricultural tariffs; (M) removal of manufactures tariffs; (S) removal of services barriers; and (C) 
combined removal of agricultural and manufactures tariffs and services barriers.   Because of space 
constraints, we report only the latter combined results, denoted RA-1C and RA-2C.    
RA-1C:  NAFTA-Chile FTA – Table 4, column (1), indicates the results of a FTA involving the 
NAFTA member countries and Chile.
15  The complete removal of all post-Uruguay Round bilateral tariffs 
on agriculture and manufactures and services barriers vis-à-vis Chile increases global welfare by $5.5 
billion.  The welfare of the NAFTA members rises, with a gain of $4.2 billion for the United States, $290 
million for Canada, and $411 million for Mexico.  Chile’s welfare increases by $740 million, which is 
0.92% of its GNP.  There is some evidence of trade diversion for a number of countries, including the 
aggregate of Central America and Caribbean and Other South American (CCS) countries.  The sectoral 
employment effects for the NAFTA members and for Chile are shown in columns (1)-(4) of table 5.  The 
U.S. employment effects are negligible, as are those for Canada and Mexico.  The employment effects for 
Chile are noticeably larger, with increases in agriculture, mining, metal products, and other private 
services, and reductions in textiles and wearing apparel, some other manufacturing sectors, and trade and 
transport and government services. 
RA-2C:  Western Hemisphere Free Trade Agreement (WHFTA) – Discussions have been 
ongoing for several years to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).
16  The most recent efforts 
to move forward in achieving a FTAA were made at a Summit of the Americas meeting of the 34 member 
nations in Quebec City in April 2001.  Since the country detail in our model does not include the 
individual members of the FTAA, we have chosen to approximate it by combining the United States, 
                                                 
15 For a more comprehensive analysis of the accession of Chile to the NAFTA, see Brown, Deardorff, and Stern 
(2000). 
16 See Office of the United States Trade Representative (20001a).   16
Canada, Mexico, and Chile with an aggregate of the Central American and Caribbean and Other South 
American (CCS) nations into what we refer to as a Western Hemisphere Free Trade Agreement 
(WHFTA).  The complete removal of all bilateral tariffs on agriculture and manufactures and services 
barriers can be seen in table 4, column (2), to increase global welfare by $77.9 billion.  The welfare of the 
NAFTA members rises by $52.7 billion for the United States, $2.8 billion for Canada, and $2.8 billion for 
Mexico.  The welfare of Chile rises by $2.0 billion and the CCS aggregate by $18.4 billion.  There is 
evidence of trade diversion for Australia, New Zealand, EU/EFTA, some Asian developing countries, and 
the Middle East and North Africa.  The sectoral employment effects are indicated in columns (5)-(9) of 
table 5.  The United States shows relatively small employment declines in agriculture, mining, food, 
beverages, and tobacco, and other private and government services, and increases in all other sectors.  
While the employment effects for Canada are also small, the absolute employment increases for Mexico, 
Chile, and the CCS aggregate are noteworthy.  This suggests that the smaller countries would experience 
more employment adjustments than the largest countries in a WHFTA. 
  IV. Analysis of Bilateral Negotiating Options 
  As already mentioned, the NAFTA countries are currently engaged in or are considering a 
number of bilateral trading arrangements.  For Canada, these include negotiation of a FTA with Chile and 
possible consideration of an FTA with the European Union (EU).  Mexico has concluded FTAs with 
Chile, the EU, and several other Latin American countries, and it is considering an FTA with Japan.  The 
United States has recently concluded a bilateral FTA with Jordan and is actively considering FTAs with 
Chile, Singapore, and Korea.
17  In what follows, we analyze the effects on economic welfare and sectoral 
employment of the following bilateral arrangements:   
C-ChFTA:  Canada-Chile FTA 
C-EUFTA:  Canada-European Union FTA
18 
 
                                                 
17 See Office of the United States Trade Representative (2001b,c) and United States International Trade Commission 
(2001) for information on the U.S. FTA initiatives. 
18 Since in our model, the EU is combined with the (much smaller) EFTA countries, this and other scenarios listed 
below as involving FTAs with the EU are actually modeled to include EFTA as well.   17
M-ChFTA:  Mexico-Chile FTA 
M-EUFTA:  Mexico-European Union FTA 
M-JFTA:  Mexico-Japan FTA 
 
US-ChFTA:  U.S.-Chile FTA 
US-SFTA:  U.S.-Singapore FTA 
US-KFTA:  U.S.-Korea FTA 
As with the regional scenarios, we report only the results of the combined removal of agricultural 
and manufactures tariffs and services barriers, denoted by C-ChFTA-C, etc.  The results for the separate 
removal of the agricultural, manufactures, and services barriers are available on request.  We should 
emphasize that our computational analysis does not take into account other features of the various FTAs, 
such as the negotiation of explicit rules and the development of new institutional and cooperative 
arrangements (e.g., covering investment, labor standards and the environment) that could be beneficial to 
the countries involved.  These factors do not lend themselves readily to quantification, however.  By the 
same token, we have not made allowance for rules of origin that may be negotiated as part of each FTA 
and that could be designed with protectionist intentions. 
  C-ChFTA-C: Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement – The welfare effects of a Canada-Chile 
FTA are noted in column (1) of table 6.  Global economic welfare rises by $354 million, with Canada’s 
welfare rising by $257 million and Chile’s welfare by $124 million.  The sectoral employment effects for 
both countries, which are available on request, are negligible. 
  C-EUFTA-C:  Canada-European Union Free Trade Agreement – As noted in column (2) of 
table 6, a Canada-EU/EFTA FTA increases global welfare by $22.6 billion.  Canada’s welfare increases 
by $6.9 billion (0.95 percent of GNP), and EU/EFTA welfare increases by $16.9 billion (0.15 percent of 
GNP).  There is some evidence of trade diversion for Mexico, the United States, Japan, and several Asian 
countries.  The sectoral employment effects are noted in table 7.  For Canada, there are employment 
increases especially in agriculture, food, beverages, and tobacco, and most manufactures sectors, and 
employment declines in mining, labor-intensive manufactures, trade and transport, and other private 
services.  The employment changes for EU-EFTA tend to be the obverse of those for Canada, but they are 
relatively very small.   18
  M-ChFTA-C:  Mexico-Chile Free Trade Agreement – In table 8, column (1), it can be seen 
that a Mexico-Chile FTA increases global welfare by $466 million, with an increase of $416 million for 
Mexico and $138 million for Chile.  Both the Mexican and Chilean gains are relatively small percentages 
of GNP.  The sectoral employment changes, which are available on request, are negligible for both 
countries. 
  M-EUFTA-C:  Mexico-European Union Free Trade Agreement – In table 8, column (2), a 
Mexico-EU/EFTA FTA increases global welfare by $10.2 billion, Mexico’s welfare by $3.6 billion, and 
EU/EFTA welfare by $7.3 billion.  There is small evidence of trade diversion for a number of countries.  
The sectoral employment effects are indicated in table 9, column (1).  There are employment increases in 
Mexico in agriculture, labor-intensive and durable manufactures, and employment declines in the services 
sectors.  The employment changes in the EU/EFTA are the obverse but are relatively very small. 
  M-JFTA-C:  Mexico-Japan Free Trade Agreement – In table 8, column (3), a Mexico-Japan 
FTA increases global welfare by $7.3 billion, Mexico’s welfare by $1.9 billion, and Japan’s welfare by 
$6.3 billion.  The sectoral employment results in table 9, column (2) indicate employment increases for 
Mexico in trade and transport and other private services and employment declines in all other sectors.  
While relatively very small, the sectoral employment effects for Japan are negative for agriculture and 
labor-intensive manufactures and positive for durable manufactures and services except for trade and 
transport. 
  USCFTA-C: U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement – To supplement the regional scenario noted 
for the expansion of NAFTA to include Chile, the results of a U.S.-Chile FTA are indicated in column (1) 
of table 10.  Global welfare increases by $4.7 billion, with U.S. welfare increasing by $4.2 billion and 
Chile’s welfare by $479 million.  The sectoral results for the United States are shown in column (1) of 
table 11 and indicate relatively small employment declines in U.S. agriculture, mining, food, beverages, 
and tobacco, wearing apparel, leather products and footwear, and other private services, and employment 
increases in the other sectors.  The sectoral employment effects for Chile show employment increases in 
agriculture, mining, metal products, and other private services and employment declines in several   19
manufacturing sectors and services.  A number of these sectoral changes for Chile are relatively large and 
indicate the adjustments that may occur with a U.S.-Chile FTA. 
  USSFTA-C:  U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement – The welfare effects of a U.S.-Singapore 
FTA are noted in column (2) of table 10.  Global welfare rises by $20.6 billion, with U.S. welfare rising 
by $16.7 billion and Singapore’s welfare by $2.0 billion.  The sectoral employment effects for the United 
States are indicated in column (2) of table 11.  There are positive, but relatively small, employment 
increases in all U.S. sectors, except for wearing apparel, trade and transport, and other private services.  
For Singapore, there are relatively large sectoral employment increases in wearing apparel and trade and 
transport services and declines in most other sectors.   
  USKFTA-C:  U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement – The welfare effects of a U.S.-Korea FTA 
are shown in column (3) of table 10.  Global welfare rises by $38.8 billion, with U.S. welfare rising by 
$29.2 billion and Korean welfare by $8.2 billion.  A U.S.-Korea FTA shows no evidence of trade 
diversion.  The sectoral employment effects are indicated in column (3) of table 11.  U.S. employment 
increases notably in agriculture and food, beverages, and tobacco and declines in most of the 
manufacturing and services sectors.  For Korea, there are noteworthy employment declines in agriculture, 
food, beverages, and tobacco, non-metallic mineral products, construction, and other private services and 
increases in most manufacturing sectors and trade and transport services.   
V. Harmonization of NAFTA’s External Tariffs 
In this section, we suppose that NAFTA is turned into a customs union, with a common external 
tariff and elimination of rules of origin and other types of restrictions.  Ideally for this purpose we should 
use the highly disaggregated tariff schedules of Canada, Mexico, and the United States.  But time and 
resource constraints prevent us from doing so.  Instead, as an approximation, we will use the sectoral 
tariff averages that are contained in our model database.  The problem here is that these tariff rates, which 
have been calculated as part of the GTAP database, are themselves import-weighted averages from lower 
levels of aggregation.  In any event, what we have done is to calculate a vector of common external tariffs   20
by sector for the three NAFTA countries on the following alternative assumptions:  (1) simple arithmetic 
average; (2) import-weighted average; and (3) production-weighted average.  We then use our model to 
calculate the effects of changing existing post-Uruguay Round tariffs to these common external ones. 
The existing post-Uruguay Round average tariff rates for the NAFTA countries are given in table 
12 together with the calculated harmonized rates.  It should be noted that these are the averages for all 
trading partners, whereas in the model there is one set of tariff rates for each trading partner.   
Nonetheless, these average rates provide some indication of the heights of the tariffs for the individual 
sectors in the NAFTA countries.  We should note also that the estimated services barriers have not been 
included in the harmonization experiment, since these barriers have been imputed from cost-price margins 
and should therefore not be interpreted in the same manner as the statutory import tariffs on traded goods. 
Computational Results 
The aggregate effects on economic welfare for the NAFTA countries and other countries/regions 
covered in our model are indicated in table 13.  With the simple average tariffs that are higher than each 
of the weighted schemes, it turns out that the United States would in this case have to raise its tariffs.  The 
end result is a rather large decline in the volume of trade for the United States and most non-NAFTA 
countries, whereas the trade of Canada and Mexico expands.  As noted in table 13, column (1), U.S. 
economic welfare rises by $13.5 billion due in large measure to improved terms of trade.  Canada’s 
welfare rises by $1.9 billion and Mexico’s welfare by $2.3 billion due to the pervasive trade diversion. 
Tariff changes are smaller with the trade-weighted and production-weighted harmonized tariffs.  
There are accordingly larger tariff reductions for Canada and Mexico and both experience a deterioration 
in the terms of trade.  In table 13, columns (2) and (3), it can be seen  that Canada’s welfare declines 
while Mexico’s welfare rises insofar as the efficiency effects outweigh Mexico’s worsened terms of trade.  
Global welfare increases by $134.5 million for the import-weighted tariffs and declines by $2.4 billion for 
the production-weighted tariffs.  It thus appears that the adoption of a trade-weighted common external   21
tariff is much less disruptive to trade and welfare than a simple average or the production-weighted 
system. 
The sectoral employment effects are shown in table 14.  For all three countries, the signs and 
magnitudes of the effects for the simple-average tariffs in column (1) do not correspond well with the 
trade- and production-weighted tariff effects in columns (2) and (3).  For Canada, there are negative 
employment effects with the trade- and production-weighted tariffs in mining, textiles, wearing apparel, 
leather products & footwear, and services, and increases in employment in the remaining sectors.  The 
sectoral employment effects for Mexico with the trade- and production-weighted tariffs are relatively 
small, except for machinery and equipment and other manufactures.  Finally, for the United States, the 
sectoral employment effects for the trade- and production-weighted tariffs appear relatively small.  It can 
be concluded therefore that the adoption of a common external tariff based on trade or production weights 
would by and large have minimal employment impacts in the NAFTA countries. 
VI. Conclusions and Implications for Policy 
  We have used the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade to simulate the economic 
effects of the trade liberalization that may be negotiated in a new trade round to be conducted under WTO 
auspices, as well as a variety of regional and preferential trading arrangements.  We have also analyzed 
the economic effects of the harmonization of NAFTA’s external tariffs.  The overriding conclusion that 
emerges from our model simulations of a new trade round is that multilateral trade liberalization has 
positive and often sizable impacts on the economic welfare of the NAFTA countries as well as on all of 
the other industrialized and developing countries/regions covered in the Michigan Model.   
A second conclusion is that while regional and bilateral FTAs may be welfare enhancing for the 
member countries directly involved, these welfare gains are considerably smaller than those resulting 
from multilateral trade liberalization, even comparing the complete elimination of regional and bilateral 
tariffs to reduction of multilateral tariffs by only one third.  Thus, the benefits of FTAs to the developing 
country partners appear somewhat limited, and, in some cases, could be disruptive because of   22
intersectoral shifts in output and employment, depending on how rapidly the FTAs would be 
implemented.  It is also the case that most of the regional and bilateral FTAs involve elements of trade 
diversion and are therefore detrimental to some non-member countries. 
Finally, the effects of adopting a common external tariff for the NAFTA member countries will 
depend on the method of calculation.  A trade-weighted harmonized tariff appears to be less disruptive to 
trade and welfare than a simple average or production-weighted average.  There would be relatively small 
sectoral employment impacts with both trade- and production-weighted tariffs.   23
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Table 1 
Average Gross Operating Margins of Services Firms 
Listed on National Stock Exchanges, 1994-96  
(Percent) 
 







NAFTA Countries                   
United States  20   35   46   40   40  
Canada 14   21   42   15*   33  
Mexico 26   35   47     39  
Industrialized Countries       
Japan 14   23   27   43   27  
Australia 15   8*  15*    13  
New Zealand  15   21   27     21  
EU/EFTA 20   24   34   38   29  
Developing Countries       
Asia       
Hong Kong  14   16   23     19  
China 42   36   72   75   49  
Korea 15   24   41     24  
Singapore 11*  13   21   26   18  
Taiwan 21   28   50     35  
Indonesia 23   32   58     44  
Malaysia 19   17   22   26   18  
Philippines 41   42   50     45  
Thailand 38   42   49   41   45  
Rest of Asia  23   23   34     27  
Other       
Chile 69   32       41  
Cent., Carib., & S. Amer.  29   40   49   32   38  
Middle East & N. Africa  40   35   48     39  
Rest of World  12   19   32   19   22  
Average 22   27   35   36    
*Taken as benchmark country 
Source:  Adapted from Hoekman (2000). 
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Table 2 
Global Welfare Effects of Multilateral Trade Liberalization 
(Percent of GNP and Billions of Dollars) 
 



















NAFTA Countries                 
    Canada  0.01%  $0.1  0.38%  $2.8  1.46%  $10.6  1.85%  $13.5  5.62%  $40.9 
    Mexico  0.03  0.1  0.32  1.1  1.49  5.2  1.84  6.5  5.58  19.6 
    United States  -0.04  -4.1  0.34  31.3  1.65  150.0  1.95  177.3  5.92  537.2 
                 
Industrialized Countries                 
    Japan  0.07%  4.3  0.89%  57.8  0.95%  61.6  1.90%  123.7  5.77%  374.8 
    Australia  -0.04  -0.2  0.56  2.5  0.65  2.8  1.16  5.1  3.52  15.5 
    New Zealand  -0.04  -0.0  1.88  1.4  1.20  0.8  3.04  2.2  9.22  6.8 
    EU and EFTA  0.02  2.2  0.58  63.3  0.94  103.4  1.54  168.9  4.67  511.9 
                                
Developing Countries                               
  Asia                               
    Hong Kong  0.02  0.0  1.56  2.0  1.78  2.3  3.36  4.3  10.18  13.1 
    China  0.18  1.6  0.54  4.9  0.79  7.1  1.50  13.6  4.55  41.2 
    Korea  0.16  0.9  1.40  8.0  0.91  5.2  2.48  14.1  7.51  42.7 
    Singapore  0.12  0.1  2.85  2.1  2.62  1.9  5.60  4.2  16.96  12.6 
    Taiwan  0.71  2.5  1.58  5.6  0.49  1.7  2.78  9.8  8.44  29.6 
    Indonesia  0.06  0.1  0.06  0.1  0.79  2.0  1.65  4.2  5.00  12.7 
    Malaysia  0.28  0.3  1.99  2.4  0.54  0.6  2.81  3.4  8.51  10.2 
    Philippines  0.20  0.2  3.52  3.1  1.68  1.5  5.40  4.8  16.38  14.5 
    Thailand  0.03  0.1  1.47  3.0  1.12  2.3  2.62  5.4  7.94  16.4 
    Rest of Asia  0.40  2.3  0.90  5.2  0.47  2.7  1.78  10.2  5.38  30.8 
                                
  Other                                
    Chile  -0.05  -0.0  1.29  1.0  1.17  0.9  2.40  1.9  7.28  5.9 
    Cent., Carib., S. Amer.  -0.03  -0.5  0.31  5,.1  1.13  18.9  1.41  23.6  4.28  71.4 
    Middle East & N. Africa  0.09  0.8  0.92  8.0  0.88  7.6  1.90  16.4  5.75  49.7 
                                
Total     10.8     210.7     389.6     613.0     1,857.4 
 
   Note:  These numbers have been rounded.   26
Table 3 
Sectoral Employment Effects for Canada, Mexico, and the United States of 33 Percent Reductions  
in Post-Uruguay Round Agricultural and Manufactures Tariffs and Services Barriers 








Agriculture 2.96%  18,705  0.33%  31,653  3.23%  132,608 
Mining -0.44  -834  0.26  438  0.08  577 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco  1.05  5208  0.05  270  0.29  9,113 
Textiles -3.71  -1,275  -0.31  -858  -1.55  -18,826 
Wearing Apparel  -7.86  -11,324  -1.71  -3,241  -4.37  -47,605 
Leather Products & Footwear  -9.36  -702  -1.56  -2,023  -6.21  -9,042 
Wood & Wood Products  1.08  5,256  0.04  156  0.13  5,765 
Chemicals 0.53  2,129  0.21  523  0.27  7,792 
Non-metallic Min. Products  0.17  135  0.06  1,895  -0.13  -1,019 
Metal Products  0.75  2,108  1.02  2,968  0.17  4,792 
Transportation Equipment  0.41  779  0.76  993  0.18  3,496 
Machinery & Equipment  1.03  1,459  1.05  2,187  0.63  18,216 
Other Manufactures  -0.48  -279  -1.74  -436  0.47  8,534 
Elec., Gas & Water  0.21  1,599  0.08  651  0.19  8,919 
Construction  0.13  2,122  -0.13 -2,340  0.10 13,049 
Trade and Transport  0.10  4,284  0.22  26,328  -0.14  -43,127 
Other Private Services  -0.86  -28,571  -0.98  -52,116  -0.25  -92,052 
Government Services  -0.04  -800  -0.24  -7,050  -0.00  -1,191 
Total   0.0    0.0    0.0 
 
Note:  The total labor force is assumed fixed, so that the intersectoral employment shifts sum to 
zero. 
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Table 4 
Global Welfare Effects of Regional Negotiating Options 








NAFTA Countries        
    Canada  0.040  $0.3  0.383  $2.8 
    Mexico  0.116  0.4  0.806  2.8 
    United States  0.046  4.2  0.581  52.7 
        
Industrialized Countries        
    Japan  0.002%  0.1  0.006%  0.4 
    Australia  -0.003  -0.0  -0.009  -0.0 
    New Zealand  -0.001  -0.0  -0.004  -0.0 
    EU and EFTA  -0.001  -0.1  -0.008  -0.9 
             
Developing Countries            
  Asia            
    Hong Kong  0.003  0.0  -0.034  -0.0 
    China  -0.002  -0.0  -0.008  -0.1 
    Korea  -0.004  -0.0  -0.028  -0.2 
    Singapore  0.004  0.0  0.036  0.0 
    Taiwan  0.003  0.0  0.015  0.1 
    Indonesia  -0.001  -0.0  -0.002  -0.0 
    Malaysia  0.005  0.0  0.069  0.1 
    Philippines  0.005  0.0  0.013  0.0 
    Thailand  0.002  0.0  -0.003  -0.0 
    Rest of Asia  0.001  0.0  -0.001  -0.0 
             
  Other             
    Chile  0.922  0.7  2.478  2.0 
    Cent., Carib., S. Amer.  -0.010  -0.2  1.103  18.4 
    Middle East & N. Africa  -0.003  -0.0  -0.017  -0.1 
             
Total   5.5      77.9 
 
                Note:  These numbers have been rounded.   28
Table 5 
Sectoral Employment Effects of a NAFTA-Chile FTA and WHFTA 
(Percent of Employment and Number of Workers) 
 
 






















Agriculture  -0.02%  -656 -0.02% -110 -0.03% -2907  0.45%  4896  -0.48%  -19640 -0.20%  -1254  -0.16% -15595  0.71% 7728 0.97%  216949 
 
Mining  0.00  14  0.01  17 -0.02  -33  1.24  1196  -0.20  -1400  -0.49  -946  -0.12  -191 -1.18  -1138 0.64  7179 
Food, Bev. & 
Tobacco -0.01  -193  -0.01  -52  -0.01 -47  -0.04  -99  -0.34  -10610  -0.05  -251  0.02  75  -0.37  -838  0.67  28096 
 
Textiles  0.02  198  -0.01  -2  0.13  364 -1.28 -467  0.47  5685.  -0.40 -137 0.61  1660  -1.21  -439  0.14  1746 
Wearing 
Apparel  -0.02  -204 -0.02  -25 -0.03  -52  0.26  157 0.53  5778  -0.63  -906  -1.15  -2179  0.72  429 2.10  35488 
Leather Prod. 
&  Footwear  -0.03 -42  -0.07 -5  -0.01 -11  0.62  27  -0.41  -604  -1.52  -114  -0.33 -426  0.08  4  2.92  9996 
Wood & Wood 
Products  0.00  187 -0.02  -86 -0.03  -118  0.21  89 0.09  3884  -0.08  -385  -0.32  -1384  0.28  120  -0.91  -12007 
 
Chemicals 0.02  511  0.00 -15  0.04  98  -1.97  -1577  0.13  3784  0.18  730  0.31  772  -1.36  -1087  -0.42  -10756 
Non-metallic 
Min. Products  0.00  37  0.00  -2  0.01  399  -0.55  -50  0.04  321  0.01  9  0.36  12221  -1.53  -139  -0.66  -1730 
Metal 
Products 0.00  -109  -0.01  -42  0.06  163  1.72  1902  0.04 1092  -0.04  -100  -0.25 -724  2.47  2731  -0.48  -8372 
Transportation 
Equipment  0.02  340  -0.02  -29  0.25  322 -2.89 -296  0.15  2995 0.52  986 1.25  1638  4.89  501  -1.45 -13332 
Machinery & 
Equipment  0.02  468 0.06  86 -0.05  -105  -5.27  -760 0.38  11145  0.19  273  -0.46  -954 -3.33  -480  -3.00  -34525 
Other 
Manufactures  0.00  68  0.00 -1  -0.04 -11  -1.92  -20  0.68  12358  -0.27  -159  -0.46 -114  0.66  7  -1.33  -1394 
Elec., Gas & 
Water 0.01  268  0.00  17  0.01  94  0.04  101  0.07  3137  0.02  163  0.02  134  0.01  20  -0.22  -11475 
 
Construction  0.00 488  0.00 70  0.01 256  -0.05  -284  0.04  5444  0.05  846  0.10 1809  0.19  1086  -0.27  -26865 
Trade and 
Transport 0.00 323  0.01  240  0.01  1340  -0.54  -7756  0.00 1066  0.05  1917  0.05 6231  -0.71 
-
10226 -0.49  -105770 
Other Private 
Services 0.00  -1597  0.00  -96  0.00 10  0.59  5466  -0.03  -12453  -0.01  -325  -0.06  -3462  0.59  5474  -0.22  -48196 
Government 
Services  0.00  -100  0.00 36  0.01 238  -0.42  -2525  -0.04  -11983  -0.02  -348  0.02  490  -0.62  -3752  -0.16  -25030 
                                                        
 
Total   0.0    0.0    0.0    0.0    0.0   0.0    0.0    0.0    0.0 
 
Note: The total labor force is assumed fixed, so that the intersectoral employment shifts sum to zero. 
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Table 6 
Global Welfare Effects of Canadian FTA Initiatives 
(Percent of GNP and Millions of Dollars) 
 




NAFTA Countries         
    Canada  0.04%  $257  0.95%  $6,912 
    Mexico  -0.00  -0  -0.03  -96 
    United States  0.00  1  -0.01  -899 
        
Other Industrialized Countries         
    EU and EFTA  -0.00  -6  0.15  16,937 
    Japan  0.00  1  -0.00  -165 
    Australia  -0.00  -1  0.00  0 
    New Zealand  -0.00  -0  -0.00  -2 
        
Developing Countries         
  Western Hemisphere         
    Chile  0.15  124  0.01  8 
    Central America, Caribbean,  









        
  Asia        
    Hong Kong  0.00  0  0.01  11 
    China  -0.00  -2  -0.01  -64 
    Korea  -0.00  -1  -0.00  -1 
    Singapore  0.00  0  -0.01  -6 
    Taiwan  -0.00  -0  -0.01  -44 
    Indonesia  -0.00  -0  -0.00  -12 
    Malaysia  0.00  0  -0.02  -28 
    Philippines  0.00  0  -0.00  -4 
    Thailand  0.00  0  0.01  14 
    Rest of Asia  -0.00  -0  0.00  25 
        
  Middle East and North Africa  0.00 -2  -0.00  -29 
        
Total   354    22,560 
 
          Note:  These numbers have been rounded. 
 




Sectoral Employment Effects of a Canada-EU/EFTA FTA 








Agriculture 1.35%  8,546  -0.07%  -6,145 
Mining -1.75  -3,352  0.48  4,513 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco  0.73  3,594  -0.02  -1,193 
Textiles -0.18  -63  0.04  619 
Wearing Apparel  -0.10  -147  0.05  974 
Leather Products & Footwear  -2.14  -160  0.23  876 
Wood & Wood Products  0.87  4,212  -0.07  -2,608 
Chemicals 0.59  2,352  0.01  676 
Non-metallic Min. Products  0.10  80  -0.01  -205 
Metal Products  1.45  4,075  -0.02  -1,221 
Transportation Equipment  1.87  3,517  -0.04  -1,018 
Machinery & Equipment  2.36  3,341  -0.08  -3,523 
Other Manufactures  1.37  800  -0.04  -686 
Elec., Gas & Water  0.13  975  0.01  570 
Construction 0.06  919  0.01  820 
Trade and Transport  -0.09  -3,615  -0.01  -1,568 
Other Private Services  -0.77  -25,741  0.03  12,905 
Government Services  0.03  668  -0.01  -3,786 
Total   0.0    0.0 
 
Note:  The total labor force is assumed fixed, so that the intersectoral employment shifts sum to zero.   31
 
Table 8 
Global Welfare Effects of Mexican FTA Initiatives 
(Percent of GNP and Millions of Dollars) 
 






NAFTA Countries             
    Canada  -0.00%  $-0  -0.01%  $-65  -0.01%  $-33 
    Mexico  0.12  416  1.02  3,615  0.54  1,912 
    United States  -0.00  -30  -0.00  -476  -0.01  -750 
Other Industrialized Countries             
    EU and EFTA  -0.00  -18  0.07  7,341  -0.00  -121 
    Japan  -0.00  -6  -0.00  -178  0.10  6,343 
    Australia  -0.00  -1  0.00  5  0.00  9 
    New Zealand  -0.00  -0  -0.00  -1  0.00  2 
            
Developing Countries             
  Western Hemisphere             
    Chile  0.17  138  0.01  9  -0.00  -1 
    Central America, Caribbean,  -0.00  -25  0.00  22  -0.00  -21 
        and Rest of South America             
  Asia             
    Hong Kong  0.00  0  0.00  5  -0.00  -4 
    China  -0.00  -2  -0.00  -18  0.00  0 
    Korea  -0.00  -4  -0.00  -17  -0.00  -13 
    Singapore  0.00  0  -0.01  -6  -0.00  -3 
    Taiwan  0.00  2  -0.01  -35  -0.01  -26 
    Indonesia  -0.00  -1  -0.00  -5  0.00  5 
    Malaysia  0.00  1  -0.02  -22  -0.01  -10 
    Philippines  0.00  0  -0.00  -4  -0.00  -1 
    Thailand  -0.00  -0  0.00  6  0.00  1 
    Rest of Asia  -0.00  -0  0.00  20  -0.00  -3 
  Middle East and North Africa  -0.00 -5  0.00  17  0.00  16 
            
Total   466    10,211    7,302 
 




Sectoral Employment Effects of a Mexico-EU/EFTA FTA and a Mexico-Japan FTA 
(Percent of Employment and Number of Workers) 
 
  Mexico-EU/EFTA FTA  Mexico-Japan FTA 
  Mexico EU/EFTA  Mexico  Japan 
Sector (1)  (2) 
Agriculture 0.46%  43,777  -0.04%  -3,639  -0.07%  -6,833  -0.02%  -746 
Mining 0.09  145  -0.04  -418  -0.12  -200  -0.12  -80 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco  0.28  1,400  -0.02  -809  -0.03  -168  -0.01  -367 
Textiles 0.29  785  -0.02  -356  -0.40  -1,080  -0.01  -41 
Wearing Apparel  0.11  211  -0.01  -192  -0.39  -736  -0.01  -109 
Leather Products & Footwear  -0.03  -41  -0.04  -162  -0.20  -264  -0.02  -20 
Wood & Wood Products  -0.03  -146  -0.00  -42  -0.26  -1,157  -0.00  -32 
Chemicals -0.09  -237  0.01  544  -0.34  -848  0.01  200 
Non-metallic Min. Products  -0.37  -12,375  0.01  298  -0.23  -7,844  0.00  47 
Metal Products  1.00  2,918  0.01  297  -0.29  -858  0.02  560 
Transportation Equipment  0.83  1,089  0.02  594  -0.61  -793  0.05  318 
Machinery & Equipment  1.99  4,156  0.01  295  -0.07  -136  0.06  1,397 
Other Manufactures  0.95  238  -0.01  -248  -1.22  -305  0.05  277 
Elec., Gas & Water  0.10  852  0.00  176  -0.05  -414  0.01  262 
Construction -0.34  -6,044  0.01  1,328  -0.03  -531  0.01  607 
Trade and Transport  -0.10  -11,756  0.00  566  0.21  24,374  -0.02  -2,730 
Other Private Services  -0.40  -21,238  0.00  2,237  0.03  1,722  0.00  405 
Government Services  -0.13  -3,735  -0.00  -467  -0.13  -3,930  0.00  53 
Total   0.0    0.0    0.0    0.0 
 
Note:  These numbers have been rounded. 




Global Welfare Effects of United States FTA Initiatives 
(Percent of GNP and Millions of Dollars) 
 
 






NAFTA Countries             
    Canada  0.005%  $34  -0.012%  $-90  0.035%  $252 
    Mexico  -0.001  -5  -0.015  -53  0.017  61 
    United States  0.046  4,215  0.184  16,724  0.322  29,226 
Other Industrialized Countries             
    EU and EFTA  -0.000  -42  0.009  956  0.002  196 
    Japan  0.002  130  0.018  1,180  0.004  268 
    Australia  -0.002  -10  0.032  140  0.002  10 
    New Zealand  -0.001  -1  0.026  19  0.003  2 
            
Developing Countries             
  Western Hemisphere             
    Chile  0.596  479  0.014  11  0.008  6 
    Central America, Caribbean,  -0.008  -129  -0.002  -32  0.008  135 
        and Rest of South America             
  Asia             
    Hong Kong  0.003  4  -0.021  -27  0.061  78 
    China  -0.001  -11  -0.006  -57  0.005  42 
    Korea  -0.003  -17  0.017  96  1.436  8,172 
    Singapore  0.004  3  2.701  2,009  0.022  16 
    Taiwan  0.002  7  -0.003  -10  0.000  0 
    Indonesia  -0.001  -3  0.007  17  0.013  34 
    Malaysia  0.004  5  -0.204  -244  0.013  16 
    Philippines  0.004  4  -0.035  -31  0.014  12 
    Thailand  0.002  4  0.003  6  0.005  11 
    Rest of Asia  0.001  4  -0.005  -28  0.014  82 
  Middle East and North Africa  -0.002 -16  0.003  24  0.023  200 
            
Total   4,652    20,612   38,821 
 
Note:  These numbers have been rounded. 
   34
Table 11 
Sectoral Employment Effects of U.S. FTAs with Chile, Singapore, and Korea 
(Percent of Employment and Number of Workers) 
 
  U.S.-Chile FTA  U.S.-Singapore FTA  U.S.-Korea FTA 
  United States  Chile  United States  Singapore  United States  Korea 
Sector (1)  (2)  (3) 
Agriculture -0.02%  -730  0.30%  3,258  0.09%  3,794  -2.71%  -127  1.28%  52,508  -3.93%  -111,888 
Mining  -0.00  -10 1.14  1,094 0.08  586 -2.97  -18  -0.10  -707 0.67  207 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco  -0.01  -206  -0.11  -251  0.04  1,118  -5.23  -2,796  0.12  3,958  -0.92  -4,836 
Textiles  0.02  216  -0.77  -280 0.05  614 -4.91  -223  -0.45  -5,429 4.86  31,653 
Wearing  Apparel  -0.02  -203  0.24  144  -0.03  -372  15.28 8,411  -0.68 -7,452  8.68  50,828 
Leather Products & Footwear  -0.03  -40  0.36  16  0.18  263  -5.40  -139  -0.78  -1,131  7.03  7,398 
Wood & Wood Products  0.00  49  0.08  35  0.03  1,145  -4.63  -1,944  -0.03  -1,317  0.08  298 
Chemicals  0.02  507  -1.74  -1,395 0.06  1,649 -5.87  -8,483 0.01  223 0.24  1,540 
Non-metallic Min. Products  0.00  27  -0.46  -42  0.04  304  -3.33  -545  -0.02  -154  -0.67  -2,764 
Metal  Products  -0.00  -95 1.41  1,556 0.07  1,975 -7.13  -2,989  -0.06  -1,568 0.71  6,888 
Transportation  Equipment  0.02  373  -2.15  -220 0.06  1,151 -5.43  -202  -0.08  -1,546 0.24  376 
Machinery & Equipment  0.02  515  -5.20  -749  0.15  4,296  -4.42  -3,067  0.01  194  1.37  6,708 
Other  Manufactures  0.00  78  -1.95  -21 0.18  3,270 -4.69  -1,355  -0.34  -6,164 4.74  23,587 
Elec., Gas & Water  0.01  269  0.03  89  0.02  694  -0.79  -298  0.01  294  0.24  2,310 
Construction 0.00  514  -0.05  -263  0.00  482  -0.05  -98  -0.00  -218  -0.08  -2,812 
Trade  and  Transport  0.00  341  -0.41 -5,927  -0.07 -21,804 1.89 14,225  -0.06 -17,633  0.61  22,198 
Other Private Services  -0.00  -1,568  0.54  5,011  -0.00  -206  0.60  1,911  -0.00  -650  -0.87  -31,933 
Government  Services  -0.00  -38  -0.34  -2,055 0.00  1,041 -1.60  -2,265  -0.05  -13,210 0.01  241 
Total   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0    0.0    0.0 
 
Note:  The total labor force is assumed fixed, so that the intersectoral employment shifts sum to zero.   35
 
Table 12 
NAFTA Post-Uruguay Round External Tariff Rates  
and Calculated Harmonized Tariff Rates 
(Percentage) 
 
  Average Tariff Rates  Harmonized Rates 












Agriculture 4.5  1.2  2.8  2.8  4.1  3.9 
Mining 0.3  13.5  8.3  7.3  1.5  3.2 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco  18.8  6.8  5.0  10.2  17.2  17.3 
Textiles 9.9  17.9  13.6  13.8  11.0  10.7 
Wearing Apparel  11.3  22.2  17.0  16.8  12.1  12.2 
Leather Products & Footwear  8.3  14.1  17.4  13.3  8.9  10.7 
Wood & Wood Products  2.1  3.9  9.8  5.3  2.5  2.7 
Chemicals 5.2  7.0  8.7  7.0  5.5  5.6 
Non-metallic Min. Products  8.2  5.7  15.1  9.7  8.2  8.5 
Metal Products  3.8  6.0  9.3  6.3  4.2  4.2 
Transportation Equipment  2.7  6.2  12.6  7.2  3.2  3.4 
Machinery & Equipment  3.2  3.2  9.4  5.3  3.4  3.5 
Other Manufactures  2.9  3.0  15.0  7.0  3.2  3.7 
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Table 13 
Global Welfare Effects of NAFTA Tariff Harmonization 
(Percent of GNP and Millions of Dollars) 
 
 






NAFTA Countries           
    Canada  0.261%  $1,899.1  -0.108%  $-789.4  -0.084%  $-612.7 
    Mexico  0.639  2,255.2  0.164  579.8  0.202  713.1 
    United States  0.148  13,468.9  0.008  764.0  0.017  1,567.5 
Other Industrialized Countries             
    EU and EFTA  -0.092  -10,116.3  -0.003  -328.9  0.005  597.5 
    Japan  -0.187  -12,167.5  -0.001  -49.0  -0.008  -542.1 
    Australia  -0.059  -260.4  -0.010  -44.9  -0.039  -169.4 
    New Zealand  -0.185  -135.7  -0.002  -1.8  -0.002  -1.5 
            
Developing Countries             
  Western Hemisphere             
    Chile  -0.253  -203.4  -0.001  -0.5  -0.015  -12.1 
    Central America, Caribbean,  -0.206  -3,438.6  0.005  82.1  -0.057  -950.0 
        and Rest of South America             
  Asia             
    Hong Kong  -0.491  -632.3  -0.006  -7.6  -0.011  -14.0 
    China  -0.283  -2,565.7  -0.003  -30.5  -0.048  -435.6 
    Korea  -0.339  -1,927.9  -0.005  -27.1  -0.018  -103.5 
    Singapore  -0.614  -456.4  -0.002  -1.4  -0.046  -34.0 
    Taiwan  -0.715  -2,506.7  -0.004  -15.7  -0.025  -86.9 
    Indonesia  -0.278  -703.8  0.004  9.7  -0.039  -99.9 
    Malaysia  -1.381  -1,651.1  -0.008  -9.9  -0.064  -76.5 
    Philippines  -1.267  -1,118.1  0.005  4.5  -0.119  -104.9 
    Thailand  -0.540  -1,113.2  0.004  7.4  -0.069  -141.4 
    Rest of Asia  -0.316  -1,807.4  -0.003  -15.7  -0.012  -70.0 
  Middle East and North Africa  -0.642 -5,544.4  0.001  9.5  -0.216  -1,863.4 
Total   -28,725.8    134.5    2,439.7 
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Table 14 
Sectoral Employment Effects for Canada, Mexico,  
and the United States of NAFTA Tariff Harmonization 








Sector Canada  Mexico  U.S.  Canada  Mexico  U.S.  Canada  Mexico  U.S. 
                              
Agriculture  -0.66% -4,168 -0.19% -17,723 -1.19% -48,627 0.59%  3,711  0.02%  1,747 -0.08% -3,474  0.47  2,986  0.00%  -21 -0.20% -8,034 
Mining  -1.05  -2,013 -0.07  -120  2.33  16,532 -2.11  -4,029 -0.08  -138  0.50  3,564 -1.83 -3,510  0.02  25  1.20  8,504 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco  0.21 1,063  0.13  651  -0.67  -21,199  1.24 6,135  0.20 1,004  -0.11  -3,329  1.25  6,188  0.21 1,032  -0.11  -3,437 
Textiles  -2.41  -828 -0.05  -146  1.15  13,946 -3.64  -1,251 -0.17  -465  0.25  3,020 -3.93 -1,350 -0.21  -580  0.11  1,320 
Wearing Apparel  -3.06  -4,403 0.93  1,753 3.28  35,772  -6.09 -8,770  -0.01  -19 0.46  5,013  -6.29  -9,062 0.00  -1 0.43  4,657 
Leather Products & Footwear  0.52  39 0.24  309 5.14  7,486  -4.99  -374  -0.67  -863 0.45  648  -2.01  -151  -0.23  -294 3.28  4,772 
Wood & Wood Products  -0.47  -2,302 -0.15  -678  0.10  4,408 0.15  725 -0.30  -1,328 -0.01  -638  0.07  339 -0.31  -1,345 -0.02  -715 
Chemicals  0.61  2,420 -0.28  -700 -0.11  -3,066 0.54  2,170 -0.32  -786 -0.01  -260  0.58  2,318 -0.29  -726 -0.05  -1,485 
Non-metallic Min. Products  1.03  814 -0.14  -4,702 -0.06  -431 0.92  727 -0.16  -5,423 -0.05  -398  0.98  770 -0.15  -4,972 -0.02  -137 
Metal Products  0.61  1,730  0.07 211  0.01 213  0.66  1,859  0.35  1,023  -0.07  -1,789  0.59  1,650  0.27  797  -0.11  -3,124 
Transportation Equipment  1.85  3,476  1.08 1,408  0.46 9,078  1.06  1,988  0.41  537  -0.09  -1,824  1.06  1,993  0.44  579  -0.07  -1,333 
Machinery & Equipment  0.59 843  2.09  4,356  -0.54  -15,545  0.61 862  1.87  3,891  -0.14  -3,936  0.50  714  1.81  3,764  -0.26  -7,403 
Other Manufactures  3.09  1,808  -1.15  -288 2.04  37,049  0.82  481  -2.75  -688 0.10  1,744 1.16  682  -2.48  -620 0.42  7,721 
Elec., Gas & Water  0.10  747 0.12  979 -0.03  -1,595  0.01  97 0.04  362  -0.01  -520 0.02  188 0.05  414  -0.02  -984 
Construction  0.11  1,848 0.12  2,165 0.03  3,558  0.00  -38 0.02  346 0.00  116 0.01  144 0.03  546 0.00  161 
Trade and Transport  -0.05 -2,049  0.06  7,062  -0.09 -27,877  0.00  10  0.05  6,440  0.00 -1,016  -0.01 -254  0.05  6,210  -0.01 -3,991 
Other Private Services  -0.02  -720 0.08  4,364 -0.08  -29,723  -0.04 -1,167  -0.02  -999 0.00  124  -0.03  -1,084  -0.01  -632 0.00  -1,340 
Government Services  0.08  1,693 0.04  1,099 0.07  20,021  -0.14 -3,136  -0.16  -4,642 0.01  2,956  -0.11  -2,561  -0.14  -4,177 0.02  4,848 
Total    0.0   0.0   0.0    0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0 
 
Note:  The total labor force is assumed fixed, so that the intersectoral employment shifts sum to zero. 